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I. INTRODUCTION
The creation and rapid growth of the internet has been “hailed” as one 
of the greatest technological advances in recent history. But a homo-
phone of “hailed,” when spoken in the legal lexicon, has serious 
implications for the internet user.  Specifically, when can an internet 
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user be “haled” into court due to one’s internet contacts?
Consider the following warning, an electronic “caveat emptor,”
appearing each time a computer user  surfer logged on to the internet to
explore the online world: 
Warning: Use of the internet may result in your being haled into court anywhere
in the United States.
This Comment will explore the expanding power courts have given 
the word “haled” and its relationship to computer communication: a 
relationship that is confusing, contradictory, and sometimes downright
troubling.  Personal jurisdiction via the internet is a rapidly expanding
area of American jurisprudence that has developed, and is developing, in 
response to the explosive growth of computer communications.  While 
the hypothetical internet disclaimer contained above could be viewed as 
little more than unsubstantiated fears of the legally paranoid, in the 
future it may be the disclaimer of the legally prudent.
II. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
Today the movement of information across the country is
accomplished with little more than the push of a keyboard or the click of 
a mouse.  The seamless integration of home phone lines and computer 
networks is reality.  Documents are mailed, business orders are taken, 
electronic mail messages are received and responses are sent, all from 
the comfort—and apparent safety—of one’s own home computer. 
But what of those seemingly innocuous information transfers?  Are 
such transfers enough to comprise minimum contacts with a particular 
jurisdiction and, if so, which jurisdiction?  The implications are far-
reaching given the expanse of the internet and the litigious nature of the 
United States. 
Unfortunately, the first cases concerning jurisdiction and the 
internet—and the current crop of jurisprudence—leave many
unanswered jurisdictional questions.  Conflict among the courts is 
commonplace.  The internet and its omnipotence in communications, 
however, has ramifications that are unique to the medium of computer
communication and are uncharted territory for the judiciary.  The
overreaching of even one court could have serious consequences for the 
most wary, the most cautious, and the most benign of internet users.
What of the layperson who sends email from her home; should she 
fear the long-arm of a state she has never visited and never intended to 
do business with?1  The businessperson, the online publisher, the 
1. See, e.g., Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 400 (Ct. App. 1997) (“Here 
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student, and the occasional internet surfer must realize that today, their
actions online can have serious legal ramifications beyond the 
information superhighway.
There is little information and there are few answers to assist the 
internet user in understanding the power of the courts.  The only thing 
certain is uncertainty.  Simply put, there are no concrete definitions, 
guidelines or rules as to whether personal jurisdiction will be found 
where one has undertaken usage of the internet.  No statutes exist to
govern personal jurisdiction and its relation to the internet.  Neither 
Congress, nor the Supreme Court, nor the state legislatures have 
spoken.2 
That long-arm statutes differ among the fifty states is the homeostatic 
nature of jurisdictional law. But the unforeseen consequences of one’s
actions while dabbling on the internet can be costly if one is on the 
receiving end of a complaint filed hundreds or thousands of miles away. 
Computer messages are quick and cheap. Defending a lawsuit many
miles from home is anything but. 
Surely the courts cannot expect every internet user, whether a 
international conglomerate or an independent software retailer, to be
versed in the long-arm statutory language of all fifty states.  Such a state 
of affairs is troubling. 
the long-arm of the Internet reaches from California to New York. We hold that the use 
of electronic mail and the telephone by a party in another state may establish sufficient
minimum contacts with California to support personal jurisdiction.”); cf. Alton v. Wang, 
941 F. Supp. 66, 67 (W.D. Va. 1996) (Although plaintiff in Virginia alleged that resident 
of China repeatedly sent threatening letters and e-mail messages, and plaintiff received 
said letters and e-mail responses, “[a]ssuming for the purposes of this decision that the 
repeated correspondence would satisfy the minimum contacts required for due process 
. . . plaintiff nonetheless has failed to satisfy the Virginia long-arm statute because none
of defendant’s acts took place within the state of Virginia.”).
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Sklaroff, Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet and Electronic 
Communication: Where Does the Internet Defendant Do Business?, 497 PRACTISING 
LAW INST. 463 (1997).
Many of the courts to consider the issue of personal jurisdiction make 
sweeping statements concerning the need to tailor long-standing principles of 
personal jurisdiction to the specific technology of the Internet and electronic 
communication. Lest there be some inadvertent chilling effect on this
burgeoning technology, some courts even suggest a need to establish “Internet 
specific” principles of personal jurisdiction by statutory enactment. In 
resolving the specific disputes that are presented to them, however, courts
routinely apply standard, well-established statutory (local long-arm statues) 
and constitutional considerations to determine the threshold question of 
personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 476-77. 
 621






























The backdrop of jurisdictional law, although not settled, used to 
revolve around those things common and tangible: presence within a
state, sales across state lines, advertising, use of the mails, telephones, 
etc. But the internet?  Can a person’s presence on the World Wide Web
constitute a presence within a state?  Could there be a “stream of
commerce” on the internet?  Is the internet a stream?  Are webpage 
advertisements “commerce”?  Can one purposefully avail herself of the 
privilege of conducting business in one particular state when the 
internet, by definition, is instant communication on a global scale?3 
In a time of rapid telecommunications advancement and ever-
increasing electronic connections between people, places, schools, 
businesses, corporations, and countries, the strain to apply traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice may be too traditional to be 
useful in a time where people can be instantly connected with other
people, things or places with one simple click of a computer mouse. 
The recurring problem with the current crop of internet jurisdictional 
issues is not that lawyers and judges don’t understand the nature of the 
technology, but that computer communication and the internet are 
anything but “traditional.” 
As individuals and industry render today’s technology obsolete, the 
courts are under near-constant pressure to develop new rules for a new 
technology—technology that is testing the limits of the tried-and-true
notions of personal jurisdiction based on the bedrock premise of
presence. 
The problem, of course, is the internet gives persons and companies 
national—and international—presence.  Instantly a local newspaper can, 
with a minimum of time, effort, and dollars, be accessible anywhere,
anytime, to any resident of any state (or for that matter, country) who
has a computer, an operative telephone connection, and an internet 
domain.4 
Early on in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
clearly stated that the presence of either the person or the presence of the
3. See, e.g., Jane Bird, The Great Telephony Shakeup and How it Affects Your 
Business, MGMT. TODAY, Jan. 1, 1998, at 64. (stating that by the year 2005 a majority of
the world’s phone traffic could be run via the internet and that internet technology is
beginning to dominate all aspects of technology development); Sudhir Chowdhary, 
Communications India 97: Showcasing the Future Tech, COMPUTERS TODAY, Jan. 1,
1998, at 38. (explaining how a deployment of 66 satellites, to be completed in 1998, will
enable almost instantaneous, continuous, wireless communications with any point on
Earth).
4. See, e.g., David Noack, America’s Newsrooms Bend to the Internet, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, Feb. 21, 1998, at 13, 13. (“Technology has increased competition. Everyone
who wants to publish has a cheap, immediate and global distribution tool through an
Internet account accessible from their living room. . . .”). 
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person’s property within the plaintiff’s chosen forum state would be
necessary to avoid offending the Due Process clause of the
Constitution.5  With time, however, the singular notion of presence, the 
foundational bedrock of traditional “notions” of fair play and substantial 
justice, was construed, formulated, modified and interpreted to allow for
constitutionally acceptable jurisdiction in a country marked by rapidly 
advancing technology—technology that continues to develop today.6 
Part III of this Comment will be a review of “traditional” notions of
personal jurisdiction. Part IV of this Comment examines the early
beginnings of the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the internet, and the 
initial interpretation of long-arm statutes.  Part V of this Comment will 
examine a few cases highlighting problems concerning the judiciary’s
increasing reliance on long-arm statute interpretation and personal
jurisdiction via internet contacts. Part VI looks to address the body of the 
Comment and the author’s concerns.  Part VII of this Comment is a brief 
conclusion.
III. TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Historical Case Analysis
The Supreme Court first articulated the scope of judicial power over 
person and property in Pennoyer v. Neff.7  Central to the early decisions 
was presence in the forum state.  “If the non-resident have no property in
the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can adjudicate.”8 
The courts soon expanded their jurisdictional powers.  Physical 
presence within the forum state from the beginning was adequate ground 
for exercising personal jurisdiction, and remains so today.
Logically, the state also should have been able to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over its citizenry.  The presence theory, however, disallowed 
state action against one of its own citizens if that citizen was beyond the
jurisdictional reach of the courts, or, more simply, not present within the
5. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
6. See infra note 36. 
7. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
8. Id. at 723-24. See also 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 80 (1995 & Supp. 1998) 
(“Jurisdiction in rem is required when the decision sought will directly affect real 
property.  A court of one state has no jurisdiction to establish, or to quiet title to real
property situated in another state, or to make any other decision directly affecting real
property located in another state, or the title to that real property.”) (footnotes omitted).
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state. That “defect” was remedied rather handily: domiciliary within the 
forum state was deemed to be enough presence within a particular state 
to allow a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over that particular
citizen.9 
B. Advance of the Long-Arm 
By far the greatest expansion of the court’s power in its exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over the polis came not by way of judicial 
pronouncement, but by the flexing of muscles by individual state 
legislatures in creating the long-arm statute.10 
In Hess v. Pawloski,11 the court affirmed the constitutionality of the
legislature’s ability to allow service of process against nonresident
defendants in the commonwealth of Massachusetts who, through the
operation of a motor vehicle, were involved in an action or proceeding 
growing out of an accident or collision while on a public way.12  “The 
question is whether the Massachusetts enactment contravenes the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”13 
The Court held that the state’s power to regulate the use of its 
highways was a power that extended to both residents and nonresidents 
of Massachusetts.14  Furthermore, the state had the power to require that 
a motor vehicle operator appoint a registrar for service of process.15  In
addition, under the long-arm statute, use of Massachusetts’s roads by a 
motor vehicle operator constituted an “implied” appointment of the 
9. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-38 (1932); Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (“Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an
absent defendant within the reach of the state’s jurisdiction for purposes of a personal 
judgment by means of appropriate substituted service.”). 
10. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1068 (2d ed. 
1987).
[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Hess v. Pawloski upholding the validity of
a nonresident motorist statute encouraged states to utilize their police powers
to enact a number of statutes asserting jurisdiction based not only on the 
operation of automobiles within a state but also on engaging in a variety of 
other hazardous activities or enterprises. As time progressed and liberal 
judicial construction and emboldened state legislatures gave broader scope to
these statutes, the usefulness of the technique suggested by the nonresident 
motorist statutes became even more apparent.
Id.
11. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
12. Id. at 356. According to the statute, “operation [of the motor vehicle] shall be 
a signification of his agreement that any such process against him which is so served 
shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on him personally.”  Id. at 354. 
13. Id. at 355. 
14. Id. at 356. 
15. Id.
624
LOWTHERPAGES 10/26/2018 10:51 AM    
  























[VOL. 35:  619, 1998]  Personal Jurisdiction 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
registrar as an agent who may be served.16  Finding that the difference 
between an express and an implied appointment of a registrar was not 
“substantial,” the Court held that the statute did not offend the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.17 
Hence, the law was constitutional, the long-arm statute was in accord 
with due process, and the courts now had personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants should an accident occur on the highways of
Massachusetts.18 
C. Personal Jurisdiction and Corporate Entities 
Exercising personal jurisdiction over corporate entities marked yet 
another expansion of the states’ authority to utilize powers not 
inconsistent with the constitutional requirement of due process.  The 
presence theory of Pennoyer19 was the bedrock upon which jurisdiction 
over a person was founded. Since the legal entity of a corporation is
considered a “person” in American jurisprudence, granting personal 
jurisdiction over an entire corporate entity was nothing more than a 
logical extension of Pennoyer and its progeny.
But just as the theory of domiciliary extended the reach of state courts 
to citizens outside the presence of the forum, the “doing business” theory 
granted similar power to the courts: foreign corporations were rendered
amenable to process,20 and, hence, subject to the jurisdiction of forums 
in which neither the corporate buildings nor the corporate officers or
shareholders were “physically” present.  The “doing business” theory
certainly is applicable to internet-based businesses and to other 
businesses that complete transactions over the internet.  Whereas the 
telephone and the mails were the business tools of yesteryear, the 
internet is the contact medium of the present and the future.  The
technological superiority of the internet does not allow users to evade 
the dictates of the “doing business” theory. 
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court further 
16. Id. at 352. 
17. Id.
18. Id. at 356-57. 
19. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
20. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) (“A 
foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence 
of consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such manner and to such extent 
as to warrant the inference that it is present there.”).
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muscled the states’ long-arms by articulating the minimum contacts
analysis.21  So long as suit in the forum state did not offend the
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,”22 the Supreme 
Court held that “due process requires only that . . . if [the defendant] be 
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts . . . .”23 
The minimum contacts analysis, when applied to corporate entities, 
satisfied the due process clause by comporting with traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice. Hence, corporations, through their 
business activities, satisfied the requisite minimum contacts and were 
forced to respond to lawsuits in the state where the contact had
originated.24 
No longer would physical presence of person or property within a
state be required to exercise jurisdiction.25  The “quality” and “nature” of
corporate activities and corporate contacts became the basis of
jurisdiction, so long as due process was not offended.26 
D. Exercising Jurisdictional Restraint 
Although the Supreme Court made long-arm statutes increasingly 
powerful, the “purposeful availment” theory of Hanson v. Denckla
placed important restrictions on the jurisdictional authority of state
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
22. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). 
23. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis 
added). In addition, 
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and 
nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.  That clause
does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no 
contacts, ties, or relations.
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that 
state.  The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as 
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the
state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to 
enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue. 
Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 320 (“It is evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or
ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our
traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce
the obligations which appellant has incurred there.”).
25. Id. at 316-17 (“For the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to
symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts will
deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.”). 
26. Id. at 319. 
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courts.27  “Unilateral” activity by a defendant alone would not satisfy the
minimum contacts doctrine.  A defendant would have to “purposefully
avail” himself of the “benefits and protections” of the forum state’s
laws.28 
The “stream of commerce” theory in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson was prescient in that it spoke of “technological progress.”29 
Use of “foreseeability” alone in determining whether a court could 
exercise personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court concluded, would be a 
violation of the due process clause.30  However, due process 
considerations were satisfied if the state asserted personal jurisdiction 
over a corporation that had placed its products in the “stream of
commerce” with the “expectation” they would be purchased in the forum 
state by state residents.31 
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,32 the court created a hybrid
requirement of purposeful availment and of continued, established
minimum contacts with the forum state.33  According to the Supreme 
Court, minimum contacts were still the “touchstone” of personal
jurisdiction that comported with the mandate of the Constitution.34 
When minimum contacts analysis was developed, however, the Court 
could not have envisioned the rise and dominance of the internet. 
“Minimum contacts” today can mean as little as accessing a webpage. 
Later cases refined notions of “specific” versus “general” 
jurisdiction.35 Against the backdrop of jurisprudence contained herein, 
27. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
28. Id. at 253. 
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a 
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum 
State.  The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the
defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws. 
Id. (construing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 
29. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
30. Id. at 295. 
31. Id. at 297-98. 
32. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
33. Id. at 476 (“Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established 
minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of 
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport
with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’”).
34. Id.
35. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) 
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various formulations and permutations have continued to expand, refine, 
and delineate the power of courts over people and entities within and
outside the United States.36 
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET: THE INITIAL CASES
A.  Early Decisions: Advertising on the ’Net 
In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,37 the judiciary analyzed
whether advertising on the internet constituted contacts sufficient
enough to hale a foreign corporation into a forum chosen by the plaintiff.  
Plaintiff Inset Systems, Inc., (“Inset”), a Connecticut corporation, sued
for damages and injunctive relief against Instruction Set, Inc., 
(“Instruction Set”), a Massachusetts corporation, for Instruction Set’s
use of Inset’s trademark, “INSET.”38 
On August 23, 1985, Inset filed for the registration of the trademark 
“INSET” and received that registration on October 21, 1986.39 
Sometime thereafter, Instruction Set obtained the internet domain
address “INSET.COM.”40  Inset became aware of the use of its 
trademark by Instruction Set when Inset attempted to obtain that exact
internet domain.41  In addition to the registered federal trademark, 
[P]lacement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an 
act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. . . . [A] 
defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the 
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the
product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum 
State. 
Id. See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984)
(holding that mere purchases, even if made at regular intervals, are not sufficient to 
support in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation if the purchases are 
unrelated to the cause of action).
36. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1069 (2d ed. 
1987) states:
Any attempt to catalogue all of the cases and situations [in which courts are 
called upon to apply jurisdictional statutes] would be futile and of limited 
utility. . . . Practitioners also should bear in mind the tremendous flexibility of
both the due process requirements in jurisdictional inquiries and the language 
of most long-arm statutes. Although generalizations can be made as to some 
recurrent issues, the resolution of individual cases to a great extent will turn on 
the particular facts of a case and the decisional law of the jurisdiction. 
Id.
37. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 
38. Id. at 162-63. 
39. Id. at 163 (Registration Number 1,414,031). 
40. Id. at 163. The problem, of course, is one company’s website address and
online “name” utilized another company’s trademarked name.
41. Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 163.  The court explained an “internet domain” 
as being:
628
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Instruction Set’s telephone number, “1-800-US-INSET,” utilized Inset’s 
registered trademark for advertisement and business purposes.42 After 
filing suit, Instruction Set sought to dismiss the action via a 12(b)(2)43 
motion for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Inset believed jurisdiction was proper pursuant to 
Connecticut’s long-arm statute44 “because [Instruction Set] has
repeatedly solicited business within Connecticut via its Internet
advertisement and the availability of its toll-free number.”45 
Interestingly, the court found the presence of internet advertising
persuasive evidence in concluding that Instruction Set’s conduct 
satisfied personal jurisdiction requirements under Connecticut’s long-
arm statute.  That decision was articulated by Justice Covello when he
stated, “unlike hard-copy advertisements . . . which are often quickly
disposed of and reach a limited number of potential customers, Internet 
advertisements are in electronic printed form so that they can be
accessed again and again by many more potential customers.”46 
[S]imilar to street addresses, in that it is through this domain address that
Internet users find one another.  A domain address consists of three parts: the 
first part identifies the part of the Internet desired such as world wide web 
(www), the second part is usually the name of the company or other 
identifying words, and the third part identifies the type of institution such as 
government (.gov) or commercial (.com), etc. 
Id. at 163.  The court realized that “[i]f a company uses a domain which is identical to
the name or trademark of a company, an Internet user may inadvertently access an
unintended company. . . . As a result, confusion in the marketplace could develop.”  Id.
at 163. 
42. Id.  (“Inset did not authorize [Instruction Set’s] use of its trademark, ‘INSET,’ 
in any capacity.” ) 
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction). 
44. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411(c)(2) (repealed 1997), but replaced by CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 33-929(f) (1997), which states, in pertinent part, 
(f) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident 
of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state,
whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted
business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate 
or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows: . . . (2) out of
any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise if the corporation has 
repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto
were accepted within or without the state . . . .
Id.
45. Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 164. 
46. Id. at 164. However, the court’s analysis could apply anywhere, and, hence,
mere presence on the internet could become grounds for national personal jurisdiction
based solely on internet presence—a result that may offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.
 629
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The court held advertising via the internet was a repetitive solicitation 
that satisfied the requirements of Connecticut’s long-arm statute.47 
Hence, the Connecticut federal court exercised jurisdiction over 
Instruction Set via the long-arm statute.48 
In establishing that Instruction Set satisfied the requisite minimum 
due process contacts, the court turned to the language of Hanson v. 
Denkla,49 stating that the “essence” of minimum contacts was that a
defendant “purposefully avail” itself of the privilege of conducting 
business in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections
of Connecticut’s laws.50 
The court concluded that Instruction Set had “purposefully directed its 
advertising activities toward [Connecticut] on a continuing basis . . . 
[and] could reasonably anticipate the possibility of being haled into court 
here.”51  The activities outlined by the court included the defendant’s 
advertisement via the internet and the defendant’s toll-free number. 
Although the court did state that Instruction Set had purposefully
directed advertising activity at Connecticut, the court, in language that 
seemed to contradict that pronouncement, stated “Instruction has 
directed its advertising activities via the internet and its toll-free number 
toward not only the state of Connecticut, but to all states.”52  In  
concluding that Instruction Set directed advertising activities to all 
states, the court drew a distinction between traditional forms of media
solicitation and internet advertising.  Justice Covello made note of the 
continuous availability of internet advertisements, inferring that such 
internet advertisements were perhaps more prevalent than customary 
radio and television ads. Therefore, such ads were evidence enough to
hold that Instruction Set had purposefully availed itself of the privilege 
of doing business in Connecticut.53 
Did the court go too far in extrapolating Instruction Set’s motives by
analyzing the medium used to communicate its message? Radio and 
television advertisements are, by their nature, directed at a particular 
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
50. Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 164. 
51. Id. at 165. 
52. Id. (emphasis added).  The court continued, “The Internet as well as toll-free 
numbers are designed to communicate with people and their businesses in every state.” 
Id. Was the District Court of Connecticut implying that Instruction Set would be 
amenable to personal jurisdiction in every state of the Union based on its internet 
activities and toll-free telephone number?
53. Id. “Further, once posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio 
advertising, the advertisement is available continuously to any Internet user.  [Instruction
Set] has, therefore, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business with
Connecticut.” Id.
630
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market. Internet advertising, however, is indiscriminate in nature and
national in scope—its sheer breadth is inherent in the medium.  The 
language of the court, if adopted by the majority of courts, would allow 
any court to hold internet advertising ipso facto indicates the internet
advertiser intended to direct marketing activities at all forum states.
Does not such a finding offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice—the very doctrine the court invokes? 
Still, in furtherance of their conclusion, the Inset court found that 
exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would comport with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice because the 
distance between the parties’ respective home states was “minimal,” and
because Connecticut had an interest in adjudicating the matter.54 
B. Business Transactions and the Internet 
When it comes to personal jurisdiction, business transactions that give 
rise to the exercise of personal jurisdiction may be the easiest
transaction to adjudicate. Unlike the uncertainty of advertisements,
conducting business transactions over the internet is almost surely going 
to lead to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the business owner 
should a lawsuit be filed. CompuServe v. Patterson considered business
transactions conducted via the internet and, based on those transactions, 
decided to exercise jurisdiction.55 
CompuServe, a computer information and internet service provider 
headquartered in Ohio, attempted to obtain personal jurisdiction over 
Patterson, a resident of Texas, via CompuServe’s electronic tentacles.56 
Patterson, a subscriber of CompuServe, entered into an agreement with
CompuServe whereby Patterson would make available “shareware”57 
computer programs on the CompuServe system. 
54. Id. 
55. 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996) (“This case presents a novel question of 
first impression: Did CompuServe make a prima facie showing that Patterson’s contacts 
with Ohio, which have been almost entirely electronic in nature, are sufficient, under the
Due Process Clause, to support the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
him?”). 
56. Id. at 1260-61. 
57. “Shareware” is a general term that refers to computer programs that are 
distributed electronically free of charge.  The creators of such programs suggest to users 
that, after a trial period specified by the creator, the user should in good conscience remit 
a pre-determined amount of money to the program’s creator for his efforts in creating 
and distributing the program. 
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During the course of the agreement, Patterson transmitted thirty-two 
files to CompuServe, advertised his shareware on the CompuServe
system, and allegedly sold about $650 of shareware to twelve residents 
of Ohio who subscribed to CompuServe.58 
Patterson alleged that CompuServe began to market a computer
program similar to his shareware.59  CompuServe’s and Patterson’s
computer programs were “designed to help people navigate their way 
around the larger Internet network.”60  In an email to CompuServe, 
Patterson alleged CompuServe’s programs had “markings and names”
similar to Patterson’s own navigation program.61  Patterson demanded
“at least $100,000” to settle his “potential” claims of trademark
infringement and deceptive trade practices.62  CompuServe sought a
declaratory judgment against Patterson in the Southern District of
Ohio.63 
Patterson claimed he had never been to Ohio, CompuServe’s
headquarters.64  Patterson did, however, advertise his shareware on 
CompuServe, indicating his shareware price in at least one of the
advertisements.65  In addition, Patterson sold $650 worth of his 
shareware to twelve Ohio residents through the CompuServe system.66 
The district court dismissed CompuServe’s action for lack of personal 
jurisdiction over Patterson and denied CompuServe’s motion for a 
rehearing.67  CompuServe appealed.68  Patterson did not file an appellate 
brief and did not appear for oral argument.69 
On appeal, the court’s decision turned on whether Patterson’s
electronic contacts with CompuServe in Ohio were sufficient to support 





63. Id., 89 F.3d at 1261.  CompuServe sought to obtain jurisdiction via diversity
subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
64. Id. at 1260.  Patterson was an attorney, a resident of Houston, Texas, and
claimed he had never visited Ohio. Id.
65. Id. at 1261.
66. Id.
67. Id.
The district court . . . granted Patterson’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction in a thorough and thoughtful opinion.  At various points
in its consideration of the case, however, the district court expressly relied on
Patterson’s affidavit.  The court below then denied CompuServe’s motion for a
rehearing, which it construed as a motion for reconsideration under Federal 
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personal jurisdiction.70  The court briefly discussed Ohio’s long-arm
statute,71 concluding that an Ohio court could exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident if that nonresident transacted “any
business” in Ohio.72  Further, the “transacting business” clause of Ohio’s
long-arm statute extended to the limits of constitutional due process.73 
The court also stated that CompuServe sought specific, rather than
general, personal jurisdiction over Patterson since “CompuServe base[d] 
its action on Patterson’s act of sending his computer software to Ohio for 
sale on its [CompuServe’s] service.”74 
In its ruling on CompuServe’s appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit concluded it would be reasonable to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant based on the defendant’s internet contacts
in the plaintiff’s chosen forum.  The court held that Patterson’s contacts 
with Ohio, through his use of the CompuServe system, were sufficient to
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.75 
In so holding, the court engaged in an analysis of “three criteria” in
deciding whether Patterson, a nonresident defendant, had sufficient 
contacts such that the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction would 
comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.76 
The traditional notions as applied to Patterson were whether (a) 
Patterson purposefully availed himself of the “privilege” of acting in the 
forum state, (b) the cause of action arose from Patterson’s activities in
Ohio, and (c) Patterson’s connection(s) with Ohio were substantial
enough to render jurisdiction over Patterson “reasonable.”77 
Important to the court’s analysis were actions by Patterson in which he 
“purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business” in 
70. Id. at 1257.  “The real question is whether these connections with Ohio are 
‘substantial’ enough that Patterson should reasonably have anticipated being haled into
an Ohio court.”  Id. at 1264. 
71. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382(A) (West 1994) (“A court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of 
action arising from the person’s: (1) Transacting any business in this state. . . .”).
72. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1262. 
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1263. 
75. Id. at 1268-69. “We conclude that Patterson has knowingly made an effort—
and, in fact, purposefully contracted—to market a product in other states, with Ohio-
based CompuServe operating, in effect, as his distribution center.  Thus, it is reasonable
to subject Patterson to suit in Ohio, the state which is home to the computer network 






































      




Ohio.78  Such availment was satisfied when the contacts with the forum 
state were a proximate result of actions by the defendant and when, 
through such conduct and connection, the defendant should “reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.”79 
The court quickly noted that the purposeful availment requirement
“does not, however, mean that a defendant must be physically present in 
the forum state.”80  Such a requirement would, of course, lead to the
logical and necessary result that nonresident defendants could never be
haled into court via internet contacts.  In concluding that physical 
presence was not required, the court of appeals once again relied on the
language of Burger King.81 
Although the district court found that Patterson’s contacts with Ohio 
were not substantial and did not amount to purposeful availment,82 the
court of appeals disagreed.  The Sixth Circuit noted that Patterson’s 
signed contract with CompuServe expressly provided a choice of law
clause. Ohio law would govern the contract dispute; Patterson
“purposefully perpetuated” a relationship with CompuServe via repeated
communications with CompuServe’s computer system in Ohio.83 
Based on the foregoing analysis, one conclusion is that something
more was required than mere presence on the internet.  Justice Brown
noted, “In fact, it is Patterson’s relationship with CompuServe as a 
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985)). 
80. Id. at 1264. 
81. Id. (“So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward
residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of 
physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.”) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).  Another court stated, 
Physical presence of an agent is not necessary . . . for the transaction of
business in a state. The soliciting of insurance by mail, the transmission of 
radio broadcasts into a state, and the sending of magazines and newspapers 
into a state to be sold there by independent contractors are all accomplished 
without the physical presence of an agent; yet all have been held to constitute 
the transaction of business in a state.
CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Southern Mach.
Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 382 (6th Cir. 1968)).
82. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1264 (“The district court . . . found no purposeful
availment on the part of Patterson.”).
83. Id.  The relationship was “perpetuated” by Patterson because, among other 
things,
Patterson himself took actions that created a connection with Ohio in the 
instant case. He subscribed to CompuServe, and . . . entered into the
Shareware Registration Agreement. . . .  Once Patterson had done those two 
things, he was on notice that he had made contracts, to be governed by Ohio
law, with an Ohio based company. . . .  Moreover, he initiated the events that
led to the filing of this suit by making demands of CompuServe via electronic 
and regular mail messages.
Id. at 1264. 
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software provider and marketer that is crucial to this case.  Though all
this happened with a distinct paucity of tangible, physical evidence, there 
can be no doubt that Patterson purposefully transacted business in
Ohio.”84 
Without such a relationship, the court admitted that “merely” entering 
into a contract with CompuServe would not satisfy the minimum 
contacts analysis; something more was required.85  Even  more  
surprising, the court concluded that if Patterson had made available his 
software on CompuServe, “Patterson’s injection of his software product 
into the stream of commerce, without more, would be at best a dubious 
ground for jurisdiction.”86 
The court, in its citation, pointed to the tension between Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi that placement of a product into the 
“stream of commerce,” with nothing more, would not be an act
indicating “purposeful availment,” and between Justice Brennan’s
concurring opinion rejecting the plurality’s conclusion on the issue of 
product placement into the “stream of commerce.”87  Without Justice
O’Connor’s exposition on the placement of products into the stream of
commerce, could a court hold that making shareware available on the
internet ipso facto allows the proponent of the shareware amenable to
personal jurisdiction in any court in the nation?  Perhaps jurisdiction and 
the internet has less to do with traditional notions and more to do with
working definitions.
Concluding that Patterson purposefully availed himself of Ohio
privileges, the court was also required to find that CompuServe’s claims 
against Patterson “arose” out of Patterson’s activities in Ohio; without a 
sufficient nexus between Patterson’s activities and CompuServe’s
claims, the exercise of jurisdiction would have been improper.88 
Patterson’s contacts needed to be “related to the operative facts of the 
controversy.”89 
84. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1264-65 (emphasis added). 
85. Id. at 1265. 
86. Id. at 1265 (construing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 
(1987)).
87. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112 
(1987).
88. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267. 
89. Id.  (“If a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are related to the operative 
facts of the controversy, then an action will be deemed to have arisen from those
contacts.” )  (citations omitted).
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The district court held that Patterson’s contacts were entirely 
“incidental” and the dispute could have occurred if Patterson had placed
his software on another network or in a retail store.90  The court of 
appeals, however, in holding that Patterson’s contacts with Ohio were
related to the operative facts of the controversy,91 reiterated the same
facts it used to conclude that Patterson had purposefully availed himself 
of Ohio privileges.92  Specifically, “Patterson’s threats—which were 
contacts with Ohio—gave rise to the case before us . . . .”93 
The court had little difficulty in meeting the third prong, 
reasonableness, and held that exercising jurisdiction would comport with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.  Although the 
court considered defending a suit in Ohio burdensome for Patterson, 
Patterson “knew” that he was making a “connection” with Ohio when
Patterson entered into the Shareware Registration Agreement.94 
Despite the court’s conclusion that the defendant did, in fact, know he 
was opening himself up to suit in a foreign state, certainly most internet
users would be quite surprised to learn that their online contacts can lead
to offline suits requiring their presence in far-away venues.
Furthermore, the law in this area had barely begun to percolate at the 
time this decision was reached—how one was supposed to “know” that 
they are liable to suit in another jurisdiction is perplexing.  To bolster 
their decision, the court held that Ohio had a strong interest in hearing
this dispute.95 
Finally, in concluding that exercising jurisdiction over Patterson 
would be reasonable, the court said “[s]omeone like Patterson who 
employs a computer network service like CompuServe to market a 
product can reasonably expect disputes with that service to yield 
lawsuits in the service’s home state.”96 
Having concluded that jurisdiction was proper in light of Patterson’s 
“purposeful availment,” Patterson’s activities in the forum state, and the
90. Id. 
91. Id.
92. See supra note 83. 
93. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267. 
Moreover, as noted heretofore with regard to the purposeful availment test, 
CompuServe’s declaratory judgment action arose in part because Patterson
threatened, via regular and electronic mail, to seek an injunction against 
CompuServe’s sales of its software product, or to seek damages at law if
CompuServe did not pay to settle his purported claim. 
Id.
94. Id. at 1268.  Although the contract provided that it would be governed by Ohio 
law, id. at 1260, Patterson may not have known that he was also subjecting himself to the 
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reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction, the district court was
reversed. Patterson had become the unwitting victim of the very internet
contacts he used to further his business interests.
The court noted that its holding did not subject Patterson “to suit in 
any state where his software was purchased or used.”97  In addition,
“we . . . do not hold that CompuServe may . . . sue any regular subscri-
ber to its service for nonpayment in Ohio . . . .”98 
C. Tortious Acts Online 
Approximately one month after the Patterson decision, the court in 
Maritz v. Cybergold99 also allowed the plaintiff to gain personal
jurisdiction over a defendant based, in part, on internet activities of the 
defendant. 
Unlike Patterson, however, the exercise of personal jurisdiction was
granted over a defendant with internet contacts who committed a 
“tortious act” within the forum state.  The court found it unnecessary to 
decide whether Patterson’s activities satisfied the “transaction of any
business” test because the court concluded that the Cybergold was
amenable to service under the commission of a tortious act provision in 
Missouri’s long-arm100 statute.101 
Maritz alleged that CyberGold was infringing on Maritz’s trademark, 
thereby violating the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and
CyberGold’s infringement was causing economic harm and injury to
Maritz.102  The court stated that a violation of the Lanham Act is tortious
in nature and, hence, the court “conclud[ed] that Missouri’s long-arm 
statute reaches the defendants, even assuming CyberGold’s allegedly
infringing activities were wholly outside of Missouri, because the
97. Id.
98. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268. 
99. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
100. 	MO. REV. STAT. § 506.500.1(3) (1998). 
Any person or firm, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, or any
corporation, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts 
enumerated in this section, thereby submits such person, firm, or corporation,
and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of
such acts. . . (3) The commission of a tortious act within this state. . . .
Id. 
101. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1331. 
102. Id. “Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction to enjoin CyberGold’s alleged
trademark infringement and unfair competition.” Id. at 1329. 
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allegedly infringing activities have produced an effect in
Missouri . . . .”103 
The court employed a slightly different test than the one used by the
CompuServe104 court. The Maritz court exercised personal jurisdiction 
in accordance with due process and inquired as to whether there were the
requisite minimum contacts between nonresident CyberGold and the 
forum state.105 
The Maritz court somewhat hesitantly analogized internet use with use
of the mails and the telephone.106  “Unlike use of the mail, the internet, 
with its electronic mail, is a tremendously more efficient, quicker and
vast means of reaching a global audience.”107  The court realized the
implications of internet usage; by the simple act of constructing and 
posting information at a website, an internet user has done everything 
necessary to reach the global internet audience.108  This language implies
more than the “simple act” of website construction and the posting of
information would be required to exercise personal jurisdiction. If 
merely setting up a website were enough to satisfy due process and
previous case law personal jurisdictional analysis, one could argue that
simple use of the internet would subject the user to nationwide 
jurisdiction. 
The court employed a five-factor test109 in exercising personal 
jurisdiction over CyberGold.  As for “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice,” the court felt its decision was in accordance with 
Burger King110 because the “[d]efendant, who has availed itself to this
forum has not shown that it is so burdened by defending itself in this 
forum that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are 
103. Id. at 1331. 
104. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 
105. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332. 
Thus, the Court must turn to the issue of whether the Court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over defendant CyberGold under the facts of this case 
would violate due process.  Due process requires that there be ‘minimum 
contacts’ between the nonresident defendant and the forum state before a court 
can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Id. (construing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
106. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332.  (“Because the internet is an entirely new means 
of information exchange, analogies to cases involving the use of mail and telephone are 




109. Id. (The test includes: “(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the 
forum state; (2) the quantity of those contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to
the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its resident; (5)
the convenience of the parties.”). 
110. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
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implicated.”111 
The court appreciated the “nature and quality” of CyberGold’s 
contacts via the website and realized the contacts “[were] clearly of a 
different nature and quality than other means of contact with a forum 
such as the mass mailing of solicitations into a forum . . . .”112 
But the court also noted that CyberGold’s characterization of its 
internet activity as “passive” was, in its opinion, inaccurate.113 
“[CyberGold’s] intent is to reach all internet users, regardless of
geographic location. . . . CyberGold has consciously decided to transmit 
advertising information to all internet users . . . .”114  Specifically, 
CyberGold’s posting information about its website and CyberGold’s
attempt to develop a mailing list were essential to its success as an
internet service provider.115 
Could a broader rule be extrapolated from this language?  Perhaps if 
internet activity is not deemed “essential” by a particular court, the
“quality and nature” of that internet contact would not be sufficient to 
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.  The court did not directly
say so in its opinion, but it is a reasonable conclusion one could draw 
from the court’s language. 
The court also pointed out that CyberGold’s website automatically and
indiscriminately responded to all users that accessed it—actions that the 
court felt were not properly characterized as “passive.” 116 
Because the website was not merely a passive advertisement and 
because CyberGold’s activities were essential to its success as a 
business, the court held CyberGold’s intent and “contacts are of such a
quality and nature, albeit a very new quality and nature for personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence, that they favor the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.”117 
The court also found that Cybergold had purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of conducting business in Missouri,118 that the litigation 
111. Maritz, 947 F.Supp. at 1334. 
112. Id. at 1333. 
113. Id.
114. Id. 
115. Id. If the internet activity is not “essential,” are the “quality and nature” of the 
contacts insufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction?
116. Id.
117. Id. (emphasis added). 
118. Id.  (“As to the second factor—the quantity of contacts—the Court finds that 
defendant has transmitted information into Missouri regarding its services approximately 
131 times.  The information transmitted is clearly intended as a promotion of
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resulted from injuries, in part, that arose or related to CyberGold’s
website and the information posted at the website,119 and that CyberGold
“could reasonably anticipate the possibility of being haled into court [in
Missouri].”120 
Hence, on the allegation of a tortious act in connection with a 
company’s internet usage, the judiciary exercised personal jurisdiction 
arising out of those contacts. 
V. DIVERGENT OPINIONS, SIMILAR FACTS: NEW YORK, MINNESOTA
A. The Federal Court of Appeals 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit weighed in on personal 
jurisdiction and internet advertising in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. 
King.121  The controversy surrounded the use of the name “The Blue
Note.”122  Both Bensusan Restaurant Corporation, located in New York
City, and King, a Missouri resident whose club was located in 
Columbia, Missouri, used “The Blue Note” name to identify their 
respective clubs.123 
King advertised his cabaret club through a local internet service 
provider, ThoughtPort Authority, Inc.124 Sometime after King’s
advertisement, Bensusan brought an action against King in the Southern 
District of New York for violations of the Lanham Act, violations of the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, and common law unfair competition.125 
Bensusan sought jurisdiction over King pursuant to New York’s long-
arm statue126 based upon the allegedly tortious actions of a non-
CyberGold’s upcoming service and a solicitation for internet users, CyberGold’s 
potential customers.”) (footnotes omitted).
119. Id.
This service and the promotional efforts that CyberGold is employing by
posting the information its website (sic) are allegedly infringing on plaintiff’s 
alleged trademark. . . . CyberGold’s acts of developing a mailing list through
its acceptance of addresses on its website are also a part of the allegedly 
infringing activity about which plaintiff complains. 
Id. 
120. Id. at 1334. 
121. 126 F.3d 25 (2nd Cir. 1997). 
122. Id. at 26. 
123. The New York cabaret was an “enormously successful jazz club” in
Manhattan; King’s Columbia, Missouri club was a “small cabaret featuring live
entertainment.” Id.
124. Id. at 27. 
125. Id.  Specifically, Bensusan alleged violations of 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) and 1125 (a), and violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(c) 
(1995). Id.
126. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)-(3) (McKinney 1997). 
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domiciliary who did not transact business in New York.127  In addition to
monetary damages, Bensusan sought to enjoin King from using “The 
Blue Note” in any “manner likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive or from otherwise representing to the public in
any way that [King’s Club]” was affiliated, associated or connected with
Bensusan’s jazz club in New York City.128  Although King placed a
disclaimer on his website to distinguish the two nightclubs,129 Bensusan
was not satisfied and sued defendant King for his use of the name and 
his internet advertisement.130 
The court declined to exercise jurisdiction after interpreting New 
York’s long-arm in accord with a majority of the district judicial
opinions from the circuit.131  Judge Van Graafeiland concluded that
plaintiff Bensusan had failed to allege the defendant had committed a 
tortious act in New York as required by the long-arm statute.132  The key
distinction for the court was the alleged acts took place by persons who 
were present in Missouri, not New York.133  Furthermore, even if the
plaintiff suffered injury in New York, it did not establish a “tortious act” 
in New York state according to N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 302(a)(2).134 
From the foregoing analysis, one might conclude that jurisdiction and 
the internet is a settled question. The Bensusan court required that a 
tortious act be committed within the jurisdictional boundaries of New 
York, and dismissed the suit when they found the alleged act had been
committed in another state. 
Credit the judge with foresight, but just as one court may exercise
prudent restraint, others, in their zeal to grab defendants from the ether
of cyberspace, may show little, if any, restraint. 
127. Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 27. 
128. Id.
129. The disclaimer read as follows: “The Blue Note, Columbia, Missouri, should
not be confused in any way, shape, or form with Blue Note Records or the jazz club,
Blue Note, located in New York.  The Cyberspot is created to provide information for
Columbia, Missouri area individuals only, any other assumptions are purely
coincidental.” Id. 
130. Id.










































B. Same Ciruit, Same Long-Arm Statute, Different Result
In another action, the federal district court based on the same long-arm 
statute as Bensusan, had a result opposite that of the Bensusan court. In 
American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc.,135 the
Southern District of New York relied not only on traditional 
jurisdictional analysis but also on recent decisions involving jurisdiction
and contacts via the internet. Plaintiff American Network, Inc., a New
York corporation, provided internet services to some 18,000 customers,
including 1,500 residents of New York City, American’s principle place 
of business.136  When selling internet services, the company used the 
trademark “American.Net” and “American Network, Inc.”137 
Defendant Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc. (“Access America”),
a Georgia corporation that also provided internet services, used the mark
“america.net” on its homepage and, in addition, claimed several 
divisions of “America.Net” sold various internet services to different
parts of the country.138  Unlike plaintiff, defendant Access America 
claimed it had only six subscribers in New York, a small portion of its 
total business operations.139 
Plaintiff American Network sued Access America for trademark
infringement surrounding the use of the name “America.Net.” Since 
federal trademark laws do not give rise to nationwide service of
process,140 plaintiff American Network utilized New York’s long-arm
statute141 to successfully obtain personal jurisdiction over the Georgia 
corporation in New York federal court.142  Defendant Access America
argued that New York’s long-arm statute did not apply and that 
135. American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F.
Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
136. Id. at 496. 
137. Id.
138. Id. at 495. 
139. American Network, 975 F. Supp. at 496.  (“Defendant [Access America]
claims that it has 7,500 subscribers worldwide but only six in New York.  It claims that
those New York subscribers constitute only 0.08% of its customer base and contribute
only $150 per month out of its monthly revenue of $195,000.”).
140. Id.
141. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 1997).  The court did grant jurisdiction under 
New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules § 302(a)(3)(ii).  That section allows for 
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary who in person or through an agent: “[E]xpects or 
reasonably should expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives
substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce . . . .” (emphasis added). 
But could .08% from New York ever be considered substantial revenue?  Why didn’t the 
court follow the lead of Bensusan in 1996?  The American court was not concerned with 
New York revenue per se, but all interstate revenue, which the defendants admitted was 
substantial.  Perhaps the New York customers provided a necessary element in the
exercise of jurisdiction, but other elements, such as interstate revenue, were as important.
142. American Network, 975 F. Supp. at 498. 
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exercising jurisdiction would be violative of due process.143 
The American court, despite the small number of New York 
customers, did allow jurisdiction, claiming “[i]t was reasonably
foreseeable to defendant that publishing its home page on its Web site,
with the offending mark, would have New York consequences.”144 
The American court outlined several due process considerations 
pertinent to its conclusion.  Exercising jurisdiction would comport with
due process because the defendant purposefully availed itself of New
York laws by signing up and by mailing software packages and
agreements to six New York customers.145  The court found a sufficient
nexus between defendant Access America and the claims raised by 
plaintiff.146  The  American court, in comport with World-Wide,147 also
found that the defendant could have “reasonably anticipated” being
haled into New York “from claims arising from the use of its mark in
selling its services, because defendant sold its services there.”148 
The court stated that there were “other factors,” consistent with 
Burger King,149 that warranted jurisdiction in New York.150  The court 
noted that the inconvenience of litigating the matter in New York “may
be substantial” to the defendant. However, the court concluded such 
substantial inconvenience was outweighed by New York’s “clear 
143. Id.
144. Id.  Utilizing this rationale, however, any state could theoretically exercise
jurisdiction under such a loose standard. Substitute “New York” for “international,”
since the effect of owning a webpage is the same no matter the state where the webpage
was created. 
145. Id. at 499. 
[Defendant] has signed up six New York subscribers to the services advertised 
on its home page. . . . Defendant also receives a total of $150 per month from 
those subscribers. . . . Those contacts show defendant’s purposeful availment 
of New York. . . . If defendant  sought to avoid subjecting itself to suit in New 
York, it could have chosen not to send those materials there.
Id. (citations omitted).
146. Id.  (“The subscriptions are evidence of defendant’s effort to market its
services in New York. . . because it is defendant’s effort to sell its services under its 
mark that has allegedly caused the confusion of which the plaintiff complains.”).
147. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see supra
note 29. 
148. American Network, 975 F. Supp. at 499. 
149. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
150. American Network, 975 F. Supp. at 500 (“Those factors include the burden on
defendant, forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in 
obtaining the efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the states in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”). 
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interest” in adjudicating the matter and plaintiff’s place of business
rendered New York’s convenience for plaintiff “obvious.”151 
The defendant argued, to no avail, that the district court should follow
Bensusan and either dismiss or transfer the action.152  Although both
American Network and Bensusan concerned New York jurisdiction of
trademark infringement arising out of webpage advertisements, the 
American court believed the facts of the two cases to be “far
different.”153  Are the two cases so different that finding no jurisdiction 
in Bensusan and exercising jurisdiction against the defendant in 
American were supported by the facts in each opinion? 
The American court made much ado concerning the defendant’s
receipt of revenues of $150 per month from six New York customers.154 
Such revenues, the American court believed, were evidence of the 
defendant’s purposeful availment of and defendant’s directing activity
towards New York.155  At first blush, $150 and six customers does not
appear to be much in terms of New York business.  In Bensusan, the 
court noted that under section 302(a)(3) of New York’s Civil Practice 
Law and Rules, the statutory requirement for jurisdiction is met when
the defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce.156 
The defendant in American admitted it derived substantial revenue from 
interstate commerce.157  The amount of income derived from interstate
commerce by the American defendant was critical under the terms of
New York’s long-arm statute.158 
Unfortunately for Access America, the relatively small number of
New York customers and the relatively small amount of New York 
revenue was of little importance; that the defendant had any customers
and revenue from New York was the final nail in its jurisdictional coffin.  
In contrast, the defendant in Bensusan did not, according to the court, 
derive substantial revenue from interstate commerce as required by the 
New York long-arm statute.159  The lack of interstate revenue, coupled 
151. Id.
152. Id. at 500-501. 
153. Id. at 500 (“In finding that the Missouri resident had not taken any acts 
purposefully availing itself of New York’s laws, the [Bensusan] court observed that there 
was no evidence that he had done any business with New York residents or that either he 
or his club derived substantial revenue from interstate commerce.”) (citations omitted).
154. Id. at 499. 
155. American Network, 975 F. Supp. at 497. 
156. Bensuasan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d  25, 29 (2nd Cir. 1997 ). 
157. American Network, 975 F. Supp. at 497. 
158. See supra note 141. 
159. Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 29.  In addition, 
To satisfy the [substantial revenue] requirement, Bensusan relies on the 
arguments that King participated in interstate commerce by hiring bands of
national stature and received revenue from customers—students of the 
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with a lack of revenue and customers from New York, represent the total
of statutory factual elements leading to the different outcomes in
Bensusan and American Network. 
Defendant Access America’s other claims urging that the case not be
tried in New York were unpersuasive.160  What about the requirement in
Bensusan that a defendant or his agent must be physically present in the 
state in order to be haled into court in New York?  The American court
only touched upon the issue.  It seems, then, that the internet connections 
were vitally important to the exercise of jurisdiction, yet the nature of
the contacts was of no consequence at all. For in American the 
defendant did not set foot in the state, much like the Bensusan defendant.
One wound up in a New York Court, one did not.  The internet contact 
was crucial, but it was not the linchpin of the jurisdictional question. 
Should the internet connection have mattered at all?  More precisely,
why not leave the internet connection out of the picture, and instead
decide the issue on the other contacts that were occurring in New York, 
namely, the customers, or lack thereof, in New York?
Both Bensusan and American Network, cases arising in the same
jurisdiction and utilizing the same long-arm provision, show that the 
jurisdictional questions regarding internet and non-internet contacts have 
similarities.  Specifically, the jurisdiction question is fact-specific and is 
heavily dependent upon the long-arm statutory language and judicial 
interpretation—a problem since this could lead to hundreds, if not
thousands, of differing decisions applied to similar internet
communications, transactions, webpages, etc.
University of Missouri—who, while residing in Missouri, were domiciliaries 
of other states.  These alleged facts were not sufficient to establish that
substantial revenues were derived from interstate commerce, a requirement 
that “is intended to exclude non-domiciliaries whose business operations are of
a local character.” 
Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
160. American Network, 975 F. Supp. at 501. 
[D]efendant does not identify, as it must, the witnesses that would be difficult 
to transport to New York. . . . Its asserted burdens in litigating the action in
New York do not appear any more substantial than the burdens plaintiff says it 
would bear in litigating it in Georgia.  Defendant therefore has not met its 
heavy burden of showing that transfer is warranted. 
Id. (citations omitted).
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C. Minnesota: Long Reach?
What about an internet presence lacking interstate money transactions:
can a webpage that provides and records information serve as a
jurisdictional guillotine for the unsuspecting web businessperson whom
pokes his or her head across state lines?
A Minnesota opinion answered the question in the affirmative.  In a 
decision that should render all internet advertisers wary, the Court of
Appeals in Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.,161 exercised 
jurisdiction over a defendant who carried on no direct business with any
resident of the state of Minnesota. Granite Gate was a Nevada
corporation doing business as “On Ramp,” a company that provided
internet advertising.162  Granite Gate’s president, a Nevada resident,
advertised “WagerNet,” a forthcoming gambling service designed by
him, on the On Ramp advertising page.163  In addition to advertising the
arrival of WagerNet, internet users had the option to subscribe and, after 
subscribing, the user would be given more information about the 
service.164  A mailing list form was available for subscriber information 
and a toll-free telephone number was provided so that interested persons 
could contact On Ramp in Nevada for more information.165 
The Minnesota attorney general filed a complaint against Rogers and 
Granite Gate, alleging deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and 
“consumer fraud by advertising in Minnesota that gambling on the 
Internet is lawful.”166  Rogers moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, and refused to produce the names of those persons who had 
subscribed to the service.167 After limited discovery, the court found the
WagerNet mailing list had “the name and address of at least one
Minnesota resident.”168  Consequently, the district court denied Roger’s
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.169 
In affirming the lower court’s ruling, the Minnesota court of appeals
161. 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
162. Id. at 716. 
163. Id. at 717. “On-Line sports wagering . . . is pleased to introduce WagerNet, 
the first and only on-line sports betting site on the Internet.  WagerNet will provide sport 
fans with a legal way to bet on sporting events from anywhere in the world . . . 24 Hours 
a Day!” Id.
164. Id.
165. 568 N.W.2d at 717.
166. Id.
167. Id.  Rogers also claimed that WagerNet was a Belizian corporation, and that 
subscriber information belonged solely to WagerNet. Id.
168. Id. However, that sole name and address may have been the investigator for 
the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office.  The investigator had dialed the toll-free 
number contained on the internet advertisement and, posing as an interested customer, 
spoke with a person identifying himself as Rogers. Id.
169. Id. at 718. 
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turned to the language of Minnesota’s long-arm statute.170  Minnesota’s
long-arm statute was similar to Ohio’s long-arm in CompuServe v.
Patterson171 in that the Minnesota court of appeals asserted its long-arm
jurisdiction to constitutional due process limits.172 
Unlike other defendants, however, Granite Gate Resorts had not sold 
any products to Minnesota residents.  The facts demonstrated that, to a 
large degree, the defendant had engaged in little more than advertising in 
the state of Minnesota, notwithstanding the retention of a single 
Minnesota citizen’s address.173  Judge Willis considered five factors in 
answering the jurisdictional question, the first two being the “quantity”
of the defendant’s contacts and the “nature and quality” of those 
contacts. 
As to the first, quantity, the Minnesota court of appeals reiterated the 
district court’s factual findings, namely, that Minnesota computers had
accessed the defendant’s website on numerous occasions and that the
Minnesota computers accessed the defendant’s website with a greater
frequency than other states’ computers.174  Judge Willis held that those
quantifiable contacts supported the notion that the defendants had
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of “conducting
commercial activities” in Minnesota.175 
The Minnesota court of appeals stated the “quality” of those numerous 
170. MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (1996).  The statute reads, in pertinent part: 
[A] court . . . may exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign corporation 
or any nonresident individual, or the individual’s personal representative, in 
the same manner as if it were a domestic corporation or the individual were a 
resident of this state.  This section applies if, in person or through an agent, the 
foreign corporation or nonresident individual: (a) Owns, uses, or possesses any
real or personal property situated in this state, or (b) Transacts any business 
within the state, or (c) Commits any act in Minnesota causing injury or
property damage, or (d) Commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or
property damage in Minnesota . . . . 
Id.
171. 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996). 
172. Granite Gate, 568 N.W.2d at 718. 
173. Id. at 717-18. 
174. The district court found that (1) computers located throughout the United
States, including Minnesota, accessed appellants’ websites, (2) during a two-week period 
in February and March 1996, at least 248 Minnesota computers accessed and “received
transmissions from” appellants’ websites, (3) computers located in Minnesota are among
the 500 computers that most often accessed appellants’ websites, (4) persons located 
throughout the United States, including persons in Minnesota, called appellants at the 
numbers advertised on its websites, and (5) the WagerNet mailing list includes the name
and address of at least one Minnesota resident. Id. at 718-19. 
175. Id. at 718-20. 
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contacts supported the exercise of jurisdiction.  The defendants 
unsuccessfully argued that their website was not and did not direct
advertising activities into the state of Minnesota, i.e. there was no 
targeted advertisement to Minnesota, only the production of a webpage 
on the internet which Minnesota residents  themselves chose to access.176 
The Granite Gate court rejected defendant’s argument and instead relied
on the somewhat frail contention that it was “irrelevant” whether a local
user “pulls” an image from a business’ computer, as opposed to a 
business sending a message to a particular local user.177  It is puzzling to
this author how such a distinction could be deemed irrelevant: sending a 
message from a business requires affirmative action directed towards a
particular person or locale, whereas advertisement on the internet
requires no such affirmative act.  Indeed, one court has gone so far as to
expressly reject in dicta the holding, and implicitly the logical
conclusion of the Minnesota court of appeals.  The words of the judge
accurately reflect the concerns of many in the legal community: 
[T]o allow personal jurisdiction based on an Internet web site ‘would be 
tantamount to a declaration that this Court, and every other court throughout the 
world, may assert [personal] jurisdiction over all information providers on the 
global World Wide Web. Such a holding would have a devastating impact on
those who use this global service.’  Upholding personal jurisdiction . . . would,
in effect, create national (or even worldwide) jurisdiction, so that every plaintiff
could sue in plaintiff’s home court every out-of-state defendant who established 
an Internet web site.  The Court declines to reach such a far-reaching result in
the absence of a Congressional enactment of Internet specific trademark
infringement personal jurisdictional legislation.178 
The Minnesota court, to its credit, did have an additional peg on which
to hang its jurisdictional hat.  The court stated that defendants who know
their message will be “broadcast” in the state of Minnesota are subject to
suit there.179  The legal precedent relied upon by the court, however, 
concerned television and radio “broadcasts,” not internet-related
advertisements.180  The court drew similarities between internet, 
176. Id. at 719. 
177. Id. (quoting Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 
1032, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). As additional supporting authority in its opinion, the 
Minnesota court of appeals cited Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161
(D. Conn. 1996) and Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
Id. 
178. Hearst v. Golberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citations 
omitted).
179. Granite Gate, 568 N.W.2d at 719-720. 
180. Id.  Interestingly, the Minnesota court of appeals included an en banc opinion
from the Supreme Court of Arizona in is extrapolation of what “Minnesota courts have 
concluded” in relation to “broadcasts.” Id. at 719-20.  See Christine E. Mayewski, 
Comment, The Presence of a Web Site as a Constitutionally Permissible Basis for 
Personal Jurisdiction, 73 IND. L. J. 297, 309 (“Lower courts have, with much difficulty
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broadcast, and direct mail advertisements, opining advertisers distribute 
messages and internet users must take affirmative action to receive the
advertisers’ product.181  Also important were the profit motives of the
defendants and the WagerNet website. The Granite court held that there
was a clear effort to reach and seek potential profit from the citizens of 
Minnesota, and in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, such effort was 
action enough to support a threshold finding of personal jurisdiction.182 
Is it wise to rest the personal jurisdictional question on the judiciaries’ 
understanding of the defendant’s intentions?  Stated differently, is not 
the motive of the defendant too thin a footing on which to rest personal 
jurisdiction? 
Where the judge said that he “knew” the messages would be 
“broadcast” in Minnesota, clearly the court did not give internet 
technology its due, or perhaps failed to understand the nature of the 
technology. First, internet messages are not “broadcast” to a particular
state.183  Second, if the judge’s holding were to be stretched to its logical
extremes, the result is nationwide jurisdiction based on the placement of 
a website on the internet, a conclusion that is unacceptable and almost
certainly offends the traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
and little success, attempted to compare Internet communications to more traditional 
modes of communication.”).
181. Granite Gate, 568 N.W.2d at 720. 
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Robert W. Helm & David A. Vaughan, Creating, Managing, and 
Distributing Offshore Investment Products: A Legal Perspective, 1035 NUTS AND BOLTS
OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 583, 642 (PRAC. L. INST.) (1998) (noting that states have 
recognized it is impossible to contain internet communications within traditional or
conventional jurisdictional boundaries); Charles H. Fleisher, Will the Internet Abrogate 
Territorial Limits on Personal Jurisdiction?, 33 TORT & INS. L. J. 107, 113 (1997). 
The Internet is a vast and growing, unregulated, uncensored communications 
medium that operates without regard to state or national boundaries.  The 
Internet is said to be ‘distributed,’ meaning that it is decentralized with no hub
or operational core, no government, and no rule book.  It has even been 
suggested that ‘cyberspace’ has many characteristics of a separate sovereign
entity and either should, or inevitably will, be treated as such. 
See also Gwenn M. Kalow, From the Internet to the Court: Exercising Jurisdiction Over
World Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2242 (1997). 
Contacts initiated over the Internet are not actually conducted in a particular 
location, but rather in the ephemeral world of ‘Cyberspace.’  Courts have not 
only been faced with the challenge of deciding whether to apply new 
jurisdictional rules to Internet-related disputes, but also have encountered 
difficulties in properly analyzing these cases within traditional personal
jurisdiction decisional models. 
Id. 
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justice. 
VI. THE LONG-ARM, THE INTERNET, AND THE JUDICIARY
The foregoing internet/personal jurisdiction opinions, and those that 
have followed, are usually decided on a basis similar to which most
states’ long-arm statutes grant jurisdiction: conducting business, tortious 
actions, and solicitation of business (or, more properly for the internet, 
advertising on webpages). 
There is no need to review all the judicial opinions written on internet 
jurisdiction, nor is there a need to recite verbatim long-arm statute from
each state in the Union.  
A. Cases Before the Court—Ease of Ruling 
Ordinarily, as a matter of fact and as a matter of law the “conducting 
business” genre of internet-based jurisdiction cases should be the easiest
to decide. As a general rule there will be a course of conduct allowing 
for jurisdiction based on something other than mere presence on the 
internet. If one is conducting business, there usually will be a transfer of
products, services, and fees from one person to another person and, in 
the case of diversity jurisdiction or in actions involving non-resident
defendants, a transfer of things from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
As the CompuServe184 court illustrated, the existence of a contract
gave the court important tangible evidence from which to conclude that 
defendant had, in fact, targeted his business practices to CompuServe
headquarters in Ohio and had performed business transactions.  If the 
evidence against the CompuServe defendant had been presented in a case
that did not touch upon the novel issue of internet communications, there 
is little doubt the court would have exercised jurisdiction over him. 
Why?  Because ordinary personal jurisdictional rules as applied to
business would have easily resolved the jurisdictional question.  No need
to consider the more difficult internet issues; a transfer of money from
Ohio to the defendant’s residence should have been all that was 
necessary to exercise jurisdiction. 
The tortious act cases are, as the previous examples have shown, more
difficult. Furthermore, when the alleged actions constitute nothing more 
than a general web announcement or advertisement soliciting business, 
the factual issues involved, and the thorny legal problems these cases 
present, are the most difficult.185 
184. 
55. 
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); see supra note 
185. Other authors have concluded as much.  
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They are more difficult for several reasons.  One, unlike a
contract/internet case, in tort actions there may be no transfer of funds, 
information, or services between jurisdictions.  The sole contact, if it can 
be called a “contact,” in many tortious act or advertising lawsuits is the 
offending webpage. If a webpage constitutes minimum contacts for 
purposes of in personam jurisdiction, our current system of jurisdictional 
analysis will have been all but abrogated by the myriad of long-arm 
statutes among the states, for a webpage is instantly available 
everywhere as soon as it is available within the internet user’s home 
state. Because an internet page is available everywhere, the person who 
created that webpage is thereby subject to every single long-arm statute 
of every state in the union.  The advertising/tortious act cases only 
exacerbate the problem.  Often courts search for the intent of the 
webpage creator in a feeble exercise to figure out whether the page was
posted for amusement, for information, or for business.  As the court in
Granite Gate186 so clearly showed, even where only one state resident 
accesses a webpage, if a court finds the intent to do business, jurisdiction
may lie. 
Using Minnesota’s logic, the San Diego Law Review could be forced
to defend a suit in a Minnesota court if the Review posted subscription
information on its webpage and that information was accessed by, say, a
law librarian, university professor, or college student.  Whether we
intended to do business in Minnesota is of no consequence in the
tortious act/advertising lawsuits: all that matters is the webpage and that 
the San Diego Law Review knew, or should have known, that the 
While it is fairly clear that doing business on the World Wide Web or 
conducting tortious activity electronically can subject a defendant to personal 
jurisdiction in a forum with which it otherwise has no significant contacts,
Internet communications cases that fall between these two categories pose 
more difficulty. In particular, the so-called ‘Web site advertising’ cases have 
spawned a fierce debate regarding the level of Internet activity that is 
necessary for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant. 
Mayewski, supra note 180, at 317-18. Susan L. Drucker, The Tenets of Jurisdiction: Lost
in CyberSpace? 69 N.Y.S.B.J. 30, 31-32 (Dec. 1997) (“While the question of
cyberjurisdiction reflects a court by court, jurisdiction by jurisdiction, patchwork at this 
time, there is however, evidence of a growing trend of the courts to extend personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant who has maintained an interactive Web site accessible in 
another jurisdiction.”). 
186. Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997 )
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webpage was available to Minnesotans.187  
i. Unintended Result: Chilling Speech? 
Important to advertisements on the internet may be the purpose of the 
advertisement. In Granite Gate,188 the court felt it important that the
purpose of the webpage was in large part profit-oriented.  Many courts 
have expressed concern for those internet users who utilize the internet
for serious speech purposes, but not for business or commercial speech.
If mere solicitation, no matter the reason (i.e. information, subscription, 
discussion, as well as business) can serve as grounds for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction, the resultant chilling of speech on the internet 
could be detrimental to what has been noted to be one of the greatest 
tools for rapid, precise, and lasting human communication.
B. Overreaching by the Judiciary 
This Comment began by exploring the rise and expanse of personal 
jurisdiction.189 The original proclamation of jurisdiction was made by
judges responding to the what and where of personal jurisdiction. There 
were no long-arm statutes per se, and the power of the state and the court 
over non-resident defendants was virtually nil if the defendant did not 
have his or her person within the forum state.  The judges and justices 
had no substantive words from the legislature delineating the power of
the courts amidst the several states.  The judiciary, however, did grant 
power over something else that could be found within the state, 
according to Pennoyer v. Neff.190  That something was “property.” 
The court decided to exercise jurisdiction over it.  As a result the
concept of presence without the person was created in response  to
legislative deficiencies.
Soon after, the legislatures of the states began to enact long-arm 
statutes allowing citizens from a home state to hale into court citizens
from a foreign state. In other words, the legislatures began to exercise
their police powers.191  No longer could people escape liability from
harm done to people in other states simply because they committed the 
tortious act from another state.
The passing of long-arm statutes continues to the present day.
 187. Actually, the Granite Gate court goes one step further: placing advertising
material on a webpage constitutes “broadcasting” to a particular forum state, turning an 
innocent act into a definitive fact, a fact allowing one to be haled into a Minnesota court.
188. Granite Gate, 568 N.W.2d 715. 
189. See supra note 7.
190. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
191. See supra note 10. 
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Fast forward to today.  With the advent of the internet, the authority of
who decides the jurisdictional question has shifted yet again, from the
present to the past, from the legislatures back to the judiciary.  The shift 
has been sudden, much like the growth of the internet and the legal
problems that have sprung from the internet.  When faced with a 
plaintiff who sues based on internet presence, internet advertising, 
internet business contacts, etc., the judiciary is stuck with the same old 
rules and statutes that long ago had been based on geographic presence,
not technological presence.  In order to effectively rule on novel issues
concerning the internet, and in order to pay heed to stare decisis, the
judiciary was and is forced to interpret the old to fit the new.192 
Ultimately, the resulting train wreck that is internet law and personal
jurisdiction193 had its seeds planted not yesterday, last week, or a year 
ago. The current morass of statutory jurisdictional law is a creation of 
state legislatures over the last century. 
Our ancient and outdated notions of geography, territory, and presence
have finally met their match against an entity that has no geography, is 
not confined to any one territory, and gives everyone an instant presence
everywhere. 
C. Is There a Problem? 
As we move forward into the next century, one thing should be made
192. Darren L. McCarty, Comment, Internet Contacts and Forum Notice: A 
Formula for Personal Jurisdiction, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557, 558 (1998). 
With the increase in Internet activity, courts now must apply existing law to 
the unique aspects of Internet-based disputes.  Defendants that challenge a 
court’s exercise of  personal jurisdiction based on Internet or computer 
contacts present some of the most  intriguing legal issues.  The law governing
this issue is, however, in its infancy.
Id. 
193. 	 Other authors have noted the difficulty inherent in this new medium: 
What makes the Internet so interesting and problematic from a legal
perspective is that, because it is so diverse, it operates like no other existing 
method of communication. Courts have encountered great difficulty in placing
the Internet into an existing legal context—is it like television, print media,
telephone or a highway?  After a few minutes surfing the Internet, one will 
encounter actors that resemble publishers, postal services, phone companies, 
libraries, bookstores, flea markets, retailers, soapbox preachers and voyeurs. 
When applied to the online versions of these paradigms, however, established
legal principles are rendered anachronistic. 
H. Joseph Hamline & William Miles, The Dormant Commerce Clause Meets the
Internet, 41 BOSTON BAR J., 8, 8 (1997). 
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clear: our current system of hodgepodge jurisdictional law, comprised
among some fifty states encompassing thousands of pages of legal code,
will cease to be effective jurisdictional law as national, international, and
global telecommunications radically transform the way in which
ordinary citizens and mega-corporations do business. 
The current method by which internet jurisdictional cases are 
determined is a jurisdictional tool that relies on geography—in other 
word, an outmoded and antiquated method as it applies to the 
information superhighway.
D. Cursory Solutions 
No one in Congress has proposed a solution to the current
jurisdictional problem.  In addition, the Supreme Court, long the 
ultimate arbiter in jurisdictional law, has not had a chance to rule, or has 
denied certiorari to, litigants challenging strong-arm tactics applying 
long-arm statutes. 
Without the guide of Congress or the Court, here are, briefly, a few 
possible solutions to the very difficult problem of personal jurisdiction 
in a computerized business and personal society:
1. Maintain the status-quo.  The disadvantages of maintaining the 
current tangled web of long-arm statutes is the purpose of this Comment.
There is one advantage to doing nothing: plaintiffs will have virtual carte
blanche over the forum for their lawsuit.  Of course, that benefit comes 
at the expense of potential defendants’ wallets and, to some degree,
defendants’ ability  to hear cases and controversies in their own forum.
2. Federal legislation. The benefit is obvious.  One rule of law that 
applies equally to all jurisdictions, applicable to the states in actions
concerning jurisdiction and the internet. Such a system is already in 
place, to a certain degree, for actions concerning patents, trademarks,
plant variety protection, and copyright cases,194 all of which can be
related to the internet. 
But the problems with federal legislation are many.  First, federal
legislation would be the fraternal twin of maintaining the status quo. 
The legislation would apply everywhere at all times, the very complaint 
that cautions against state long-arm statutes.  In other words, there is 
little difference between applying one state’s long-arm statute to all 
internet communications, and allowing all the states to apply a federal
law to all internet communications: the unwary internet user, despite
 194. FED. R. CIV. P. 1338(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety
protection, copyrights, and trade-marks.”). 
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knowing the United States Code, may still be hauled off to a foreign 
state under original jurisdictional laws passed by the Congress. 
In addition, federalism concerns abound.  Unlike trademark and
copyright, which are governed by Acts of Congress, many issues related
to jurisdictional internet communication problems concern civil actions
that arise under state law, such as tort and contract.  Federalizing actions 
that would normally be within the auspices of state law would wrest
from citizens the ability to regulate their own affairs, including those that
concern the internet. If a national law is rejected in favor of state-
defined long-arm jurisdiction, judicial interpretation and not
Congressional legislation will still be the final arbiter of personal
jurisdiction via the internet. 
3. Remove Internet Contacts from the Jurisdictional Equation. In other 
words, a national federal rule or Supreme Court order that, in 
determining whether personal jurisdiction should be exercised, the
defendant’s internet contacts shall not be given any weight.  Perhaps 
something more than a mere internet information exchange would be 
required to exercise personal jurisdiction. For example, a money
transfer would have to take place, a contract between two parties would 
be required, or an exchange of goods via conventional business practice 
would be required to hale a defendant into any particular forum state.
The advantage is obvious. A quick, easy rule to understand and 
implement nationwide.  Simply put, as far as in personam personal 
jurisdiction goes, the internet doesn’t count.  Easy enough.  But there are 
still problems. 
First, such a rule smacks of federalism (i.e. denying a state legislature 
the ability to craft a long-arm statute that incorporates internet contacts), 
and, hence, the concern mentioned in the second suggestion is directly 
applicable. 
Second, should internet contacts be discounted in such a cavalier 
fashion? For example, what of a hypothetical Florida resident who
emails death threats to a young child in Arizona?  Should the Arizona 
attorney general be prevented from haling the Florida mailer to Arizona? 
Exceptions could be made to allow personal jurisdiction flowing from 
internet activity where felony criminal conduct lies.  In civil actions, 
then, internet contacts without more could not be used to hale one 
resident to the far away state of another.  But this too has problems. 
What if the alleged conduct concerns trademark or copyright
infringement?  District courts already have original jurisdiction over 
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those matters.195  Further, should a plaintiff be forced to travel to a
trademark infringer’s home state to prevent illegal conduct?  On its face 
it seems only fair to require that a copyright violator be forced to defend 
herself where her actions allegedly caused damage. 
And what of other business practices, like using the telephone or 
facsimile?  Are they not akin to using the internet?  Both technologies 
utilize telephone lines; why should a phone call satisfy a requisite 
minimum contact test whereas computer contact via the same phone line 
is not? 
VII. CONCLUSION
Expansive ruling on internet communication, personal jurisdiction, 
and long-arm statutes at this still-early juncture in the information age 
would be premature.  The judiciary’s ever-expansive broad-based
interpretations of long-arm statutes, however, does not bode well for the 
individual or the business internet user seeking to limit online liability.
In short, the prudence and wisdom of the judiciary must counterbalance 
the failings of statutory law. 
JOHN A. LOWTHER IV 
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